Philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement have asked how one ought, if at all, to revise one’s beliefs or credences when confronted with facts about others who disagree. For it can seem at first blush that the mere existence of disagreement, at least when it is with those who are roughly one’s peers with …
Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment Read More »
Tom Cochrane’s book forges into the philosophy of emotion on a new and powerful vehicle: the idea of valent representations. His project is ambitious. Cochrane uses valent representations to give models of affect, pleasure and pain, emotion, moods, expressive behavior, social intentionality, norms, collective effervescence, inner speech, sentiments, personality, and character. Philosophers interested in any of these topics …
The Emotional Mind: A Control Theory of Affective States Read More »
Declan Smithies’ book is an extraordinarily strong contribution to debates in philosophy of mind and epistemology. It is ambitious and expansive in scope while being extremely rigorously argued. It will be required reading for epistemologists, as well as for philosophers of mind interested in the value of consciousness for our lives as thinkers and knowers. …
In this fine collection, Christian Seidel has brought together innovative new work on consequentialism, with a special focus on the theoretical strategy of “consequentializing” agent-centered (deontological) moral theories. It is an excellent resource for anyone seeking to better understand and evaluate the conceptual foundations of consequentialism. Seidel’s introduction is a real strength of the book, …
Joseph C. Pitt’s slim new book argues persuasively that the philosopher’s traditional focus on theories as the essence of science is misplaced. This kind of objection is frequently leveled at philosophers by historians and those in science studies, and for good reason. Pitt’s critique is much broader and more interesting than the typical one since …
Heraclitus Redux: Technological Infrastructures and Scientific Change Read More »
In the introduction to the book, Sarah McGrath explains her key aims. She has an overall working hypothesis: moral knowledge can be acquired in any of the ways in which we acquire ordinary empirical knowledge, and our efforts to acquire and preserve such knowledge are subject to frustration in all of the same ways that our …
When you were born into the world, you began with a basic repertoire of sensory-perceptual experiences representing the world around you. On the basis of those experiences, you acquired beliefs and desires about things in your environment. Then you learned a language and became able to think about a great many things far outside of …
Roughly sixty years ago, certain interpreters dragged the study of Plato’s dialogues into the modern world by subjecting them to analytic philosophical methods. So goes the prevailing history of Plato scholarship. With this development, specialists could explain their research to their colleagues using familiar modern categories, and — what is perhaps just another way of …
Philosophy as Drama: Plato’s Thinking through Dialogue Read More »
Dialetheism (or, more simply, “glut theory” as dual of familiar truth-value “gap theories”) is the view according to which there are true contradictions. Quite a hard view to legitimate, which explains why it seems to have only very few genuine supporters. Yet, it is not, or it is supposed not to be, confused with the …
This timely collection of essays explores a bustling area of moral epistemology, namely, how higher-order evidence affects the rationality of moral beliefs. Arguments from disagreement between moral peers and evolutionary debunking arguments both employ higher-order evidence to try to establish that some/many/all of our moral beliefs are unjustified and do not amount to knowledge. Epistemology …